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1. Introduction 
What I aim at in this essay is to give a guideline to contemporary common morality debate, as 
I point out what I see as two common problems that occur in the field of comparative cultural 
studies related to the common morality debate. Since the issues about common morality 
become increasingly important in today’s medical ethics, this paper would help, I hope, 
particularly medical professionals, medical ethicists, hospital lawyers, etc. The thesis of this 
paper is as follows. In the field of contemporary comparative cultural studies with regard to 
common-morality theses1 and to opposing theses of common morality2, so-called the 
                                                                          
1 Common morality can be viewed broadly in two ways. One is the descriptive sense of common 
morality, which takes morality broadly as the “morality commonly practised by rational people.” The 
earliest use of this sense may be John Stuart Mill’s “customary morality” in Ch. 3 Utilitarianism. In the 
contemporary bioethical discussion, the plainest version of the descriptive sense of common morality 
simply affirms the phenomenon that a vast majority of, not all, people agree about a set of moral 
precepts or codes. The other is the prescriptive or normative sense of common morality. Taken in this 
sense, it argues that people ought to obey a set of moral precepts or codes. However, in the 
contemporary bioethics field, not only the descriptive but also the prescriptive senses of common 
morality are discussed without being conceived necessarily as universal or absolute, in the sense that 
common morality does not need to apply to all people and all times. (Carson Strong, “Exploring 
Questions about Common Morality,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 30, no. 1 [January 2009]: 3). 
Therefore, in the common morality debate, the “grouping issue” – that is, drawing the line by a region, 
a timeline, a religion, a country, etc., to group people common morality applies to – is one of the most 
important topics. In this essay, I use the term “common-morality” to include the both the descriptive 
and prescriptive senses. Also, it should be noted that the argument by empirical evidence can be used 
either to affirm or to deny the both senses of common morality.  
2 A variety of opposing theories or theses of common morality are available. Some examples are as 
follows. Isaiah Berlin’s value pluralism, though it is a metaethical rather than normative theory, argues 
that certain moral values are equally valid and fundamental but incompatible with each other 
(“incompatible” in the sense that they can be in conflict with each other) and however that there cannot 
be a lexical ordering of these incompatible values (thereby making themselves “incommensurable” to 
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“argument from empirical evidence” has been the most popular argument. The opponents of 
common morality have presented the examples that show how the cultures in question differ 
from each other in their respective moral judgments or evaluations. On the other hand, the 
defenders of common morality have stressed homogeneity between different cultures by 
adducing some selected examples of their own. However, I find both dissenting parties’ 
arguments careless, if not misleading, for two reasons. I lay out the reasons under the title of 
“two cautions” the both parties need to have when they argue. First, the advocates of and the 
opponents of common morality, I observe, consciously or unconsciously, fabricate the 
definitions of moral terms that would naturally lead to the outcomes they desire. To elaborate 
it in detail, I use two levels of understanding moral terms, that is, “formal level” and 
“material-content level.” The formal level of understanding is to define the terms in a thin 
manner. The concept is thin in the sense that the meaning of the term is broad and general. On 
the other hand, the material-content level of understanding is to conceive the terms in a thick 
manner. The thick meaning is attained when people try to understand the terms against 
concrete situational contexts which involves rich cultural elements. The same moral term can 
be defined in the thin, formal level, as well as in the thick, material-content level. For example, 
“autonomy” can be understood in the formal level as “self-governed act,” and in the material-
content level as “the act of making their own informed decisions on their own life and death.” 
The researchers of comparative cultural studies, of course, give at times a definition thinner 
than the former and thicker than the latter. The researchers devise the formal or material-
content meanings of the moral terms in their own thickness or thinness level, the fact of which 
predetermines what examples they would select for their comparative cultural investigations 
and how they would interpret the examples to support their differing theoretical positions, 
either pro or contra common morality. However, given that the formal and material-content 
levels of understanding the terms are both theoretically valid and philosophically important, 
the backbone of their arguments from empirical evidences, i.e., that a set of neutral examples 
the researchers impartially discover in different cultures supports their theoretical conclusions, 
is defeated.  
Second, the examples chosen to be the empirical evidences may not be as simple and clear-
cut as the researchers think they are, mainly because the situational contexts where the cases 
are located between two different cultures vastly differ. Accordingly, the examples may not 
be proper to be “evidences.” However, this does not support the opposing theses of 
common morality. Rather, it just shows that there are hardly “proper data”, based on which 
two cultures can be compared.  
To elaborate the thesis so far in organized details and to flesh it out in actual cases of 
comparative cultural studies, this paper has the following arrangement. The first two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
each other). Religious-moral pluralism, a corollary of John Hick’s religious pluralism, many see, argues 
that religious-moral diversities in the world point to metaphysical reality. Moral relativism (an 
orthodox kind) makes the prescriptive claim that there are no fixed “moral absolutes.” Moral 
subjectivism typically starts with the claim (owing to David Hume) that moral evaluation/decision or 
the existence of moral concepts is merely the product of human mind; nevertheless, this position can 
depart from here to argue that the morality as what human mind creates embraces the fact that the 
fundamental moral structure of human beings is the same thereby producing similar, if not same, moral 
codes. However, when this subjectivism delimits its claim purely as descriptive, it can be an opposing 
view of the prescriptive sense of common morality.   
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following sections will be devoted to setting out the meanings of some key terms used in 
this paper. First, “culture” and “tradition” are defined. Second, the “formal level” of and 
“material-content level” of understanding moral terms are spelled out. In the following 
section, I provide general background of and some detailed content of two different 
cultures. I select Western liberal individualist culture and East Asian neo-Confucian culture. 
Since this paper intends to be presented to the audiences familiar with the liberal 
individualist culture, introducing its basic content and background is deemed unnecessary. 
Thus, neo-Confucian culture is only introduced. In the next section, against the backdrop of 
the knowledge provided so far, I show a set of examples of comparative culture between the 
Western and the East Asian culture. The cases will show how the different cultures 
respectively understand “beneficence” and “autonomy,” the two concepts widely used in 
the field of medical ethics. Meanwhile, under the title of “two cautions,” I attempt to show 
how different choices of defining the same moral terms by the researchers would influence 
their interpretations of the moral structure of the two cultures compared. In the conclusion 
section, I make my own suggestion where the current scholarly investigation of comparative 
cultural studies vis-à-vis common morality should be directed to, particularly from the 
perspective of contemporary medical ethics.    
2. A traditon and a culture  
Following Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift’s usage, I define the term “tradition” as the 
medium by which “a set of practices” “are shaped and transmitted across generations.” It 
refers primarily to “religious or moral (e.g., Anabaptist or humanist), economic (e.g., a 
particular craft or profession, trade union or manufacturer), aesthetic (e.g., modes of 
literature or painting), or geographical (e.g., crystallizing around the history and culture of a 
particular house, village or region).”3 I consider what is referred to as “culture” to hold the 
same meaning as the tradition, though the geographical boundary of the former should be 
broader than that of the latter. Along with the definitions above, I also propose 
“complimentary definitions” 4 of culture and tradition. That is, tradition and culture are 
essentially psycho-epistemic phenomena. Given that culture has a larger geographic 
boundary than tradition, the former can be said a macro psycho-epistemic phenomenon 
while the latter a micro one. And readers should note that what I want to treat in this paper 
is culture rather than tradition, i.e., Western liberal individualist culture and East Asian neo-
Confucian culture.  
A culture influences a tradition and vice versa. The former is the case, as the culture 
influences how people within its boundary should think and behave by determining social 
and ethical values in it. Thus, traditions that exist within the culture (if they are not 
extremely isolated ones like that of the Amish community) cannot be intact from the 
influence of the culture. On the other hand, the tradition can influence the culture. 
Traditions are destined to play by the rule of survival of the fittest within the boundary of 
the culture the traditions belong to, so the strong or powerful traditions continue to survive 
and thrive while participating in re-shaping of the culture. Having said so, I focus, in this 
essay, on power of culture, not tradition. Readers should note culture’s power on the 
                                                                          
3 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 90. 
4 Note that two complementary meanings are two different, yet legitimate, ways of interpreting one and 
the same state of affair. 
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tradition. A good example of this can be to compare how Christian churches (or Christian 
traditions) within the contemporary Western liberal individualist culture, such as Britain 
and North America, celebrate St. Patrick’s Day and Christmas, with how they did in the 
Medieval Europe.  
3. Two different levels of understanding moral terms  
The set of concepts like “form” and “material content” is widely used in ethics debates 
today. If the value, “do not lie”, is a “formal” ethical injunction, its “material content” 
stipulates how to carry out the injunction in a concrete situational context. The material 
contents come in different shapes and sizes depending on the situational context. The formal 
principle, “do not lie”, has various material contents, one of which can be “physicians must 
not withhold from their patients the information related to the patients’ health condition.” 
Some material contents are more specific than others. In many cases, the material content 
gets more specified as the scope and range of the value gets further elaborated. For instance, 
the material content introduced above can be further specified to “physicians must not 
withhold from their cancer patients the information that the patients will die soon.” And a 
greatly specified material content appears, as the ethicist uses the “metaphor of 
specification” to solve moral dilemmas, particularly by using except- and unless-clauses.5 
E.g., the conflict or tension between “do not lie” and “save others” can be specified away by 
forming the following specified rule, “physicians must not withhold from their cancer 
patients the information that they will die except-that (or unless) it seems greatly obvious that 
the information revealed will harm the patients like increasing distress or shortening life 
significantly by shock.”  
To make clear how the form and material content are used as two different levels of 
understanding moral terms, another popular set of concepts used in contemporary ethics 
and bioethics should be introduced, that is, “thick” and “thin,” the concepts known to be 
coined by Bernard Williams. In my expansion of Williams’ terms, the “thick” and “thin” 
have at least two different sets of meanings. The first set is to understand the concepts in 
terms of a theoretical status. E.g., an ethical theory or principle or concept is “thick” in the 
sense that it treats practical moral life or is concerned with concrete/substantive level of 
morality; whereas “thin” in that it covers the abstract or speculative realm of morality. The 
other set is to conceive the thick and thin from the standpoint of content. E.g., the theory or 
principle or concept is “thick” in that it utilizes the values or norms or virtues that a 
particular culture or tradition holds, while “thin” in that it handles moral values or norms or 
virtues in a minimal sense.6 In this essay, I shall focus only on the latter set, the “thick” and 
“thin” viewed in the light of content.  
A moral term can have thick and thin definitions. To speak from the standpoint of 
comparative cultural studies, the thick definition of the term is the meaning attained as a 
particular society understands the term against its rich cultural backdrop. In other words, 
the thick definition has a culture-specific meaning. On the other hand, the thin definition of 
                                                                          
5 For the except- and unless-clauses, see Paul Ramsey, "The Case of the Curious Exception" in Norm and 
Context in Christian Ethics (1968), 74-93.  
6 It should be noted that the two ways of using the terms sometimes overlap. 
www.intechopen.com
Two Cautions for a Common Morality Debate: Investigating the Argument from Empirical 
Evidence Through the Comparative Cultural Study Between Western Liberal Individualist Culture... 
 
5 
the term is minimal in that its meaning is attained when people try to understand the term 
in a broad and general sense. Thus, the thin definition is mostly cross-cultural. However, the 
thick and thin definitions are not absolute or in isolation; they are in gradation and relative 
to each other. That is, the less thick the definition is, the thinner it is.  
These definitions are not obtained through a neutral scholarly observation. How thinner or 
thicker the definition can be is determined based on how detailed the researchers go down 
to define the word in terms of including culture-specific materials. For example, defining the 
Korean moral term, han, has been one of the most interesting projects in the community of 
East Asian Christian theologians. Some scholars claim that han is so unique that it cannot be 
translated into the term which Westerners can grasp. For example, the Korean theologian, 
Jae Hoon Lee defines han to be something like “frustrated wish,” “depressed anxiety,” 
“envy,” etc. stored deep in Korean mind through their unique cultural history as oppressed 
people.7 He finds the uniqueness of han to lie in the Korean culture shown in “art, music, 
dance, and paintings . . . and literature (like poetry, folktales, myths, legends, novels, and 
theater).”8 In sum, he views han in the thick definition. On the other hand, some theologians, 
like Andrew Sung Park, argue that the meaning of han is accessible to all cultures. For Park, 
the meaning of han is rather cross-cultural, in the sense that all cultures can understand it in 
a universal theological program. For him, han is “anger and bitterness of victims,” while sin 
is “willful harm done to others.” Hoping to improve what he believes to be one sidedness of 
the traditional Western doctrine that focuses on “sin,” Park argues that the concept of han 
should be accepted as parallel to sin in the Christian theology. If sin is the problem on the 
side of the oppressor, han is that on the side of the oppressed, he claims. In short, Park sees 
the meaning of han in the thin definition.9 
To return to the discussion of form and material content, the thin definition, as readers may 
already have noticed it, concerns the formal understanding of the term, while the thick 
definition largely bears the material content of the formal conception of the term. To put 
alternatively,  inasmuch as comparative cultural study is concerned, the formal level of 
understanding of the moral term is to conceive the term to be thin, that is, minimal, general, 
and cross-cultural; while the material-content level of understanding is to view the term as 
thick, that is, culture-specific. If so, for instance, to conceive “honesty” and “beneficence” as 
thin definitions (respectively to be the “act of telling truth” and to be a “charitable act”) is to 
understand the terms in the formal level. However, two different cultures may differ when 
their respective members understand what the acts are in terms of material content. E.g., 
North Koreans may apprehend the charitable act as related to obeying the will of their 
beloved leader, Kim Jŏng-il, whereas many North Americans and Western Europeans 
understand the charitable act to include endorsing women’s right on abortion and gay 
marriage. To define autonomy and beneficence while being sensitive to cultural variation is 
to understand the terms to be thick as well as be in the material-content level. I believe I can 
turn now to comparative cultural studies. 
                                                                          
7 Jae Hoon Lee, The Exploration of the Inner Wounds – Han (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press: 1994) 14, 33, 
52. Note that han is not always a collective term. It can be for a group or an individual.  
8 Ibid., 1-2. For understanding of han in terms of its cultural uniqueness, see chapter 5, “The Han in the 
Symbolism of Korean Shamanism.”  
9 Andrew Park, The Wounded Heart of God (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993), 10.  
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4. A short introduction to neo-Confucian ethics in Korean society  
I begin with the general background and content of neo-Confucianism in Korea (South 
Korea). Initially, Confucianism as a fragmented set of Confucian tenets may have reached 
the Korean peninsula through the Chinese officials who dominated the northern part of 
Korea during the first three centuries A.D. It is reportedly said that in A.D. 372 a Confucian 
academy was established in the ancient Korean kingdom, Koguryŏ (B.C.37-A.D.668). 
However, it was not until the rise of the Chosŏn dynasty in the 14th century that Korea 
officially transformed itself into a Confucian kingdom. The new dynasty set out by adopting 
the Chinese philosopher, Zhu Xi’s version of Confucianism (which we usually call “neo-
Confucianism”) as the nation’s ethico-political ideology as well as practical governing 
principles.10 Since then, neo-Confucianism has been one of the most powerful intellectual 
elements consisting of Korea’s social and ethical milieu.  
To discuss the practical ethical ethos of neo-Confucian East Asia (particularly Korea), it 
seems apt to introduce the ethical codes of the “Three Bonds and Five Relations” (三綱五倫) 
– note that the “bond” here means not merely a relationship but a standard. The Three 
Bonds state that the cosmic, a priori moral bonds are hierarchically set as 1) the son loves and 
serves his father (父爲子綱), 2) the subject loves and serves his king (君爲臣綱), and 3) the 
wife loves and serves her husband (夫爲婦綱). In accordance of the cosmic statutes, the Five 
Relations stipulate the presence of 1) trust and faith or yi (義) between king and subject 
(君臣有義), 2) filial-parental affection or qin/chin (親)11 between father and son (父子有 親), 
3) a distinction or bie/byul (別) between husband and wife (夫婦有別), 4) an order or xu/suh 
(序) between the older and the younger (長幼有序), and 5) loyalty or xin/shin (信) between 
friends (朋友有信).12 As shown, the first four relations hold hierarchical structures and the 
last non-hierarchical one. 
Many scholars believe that the Three Bonds and Five Relations were propagated by the 
Chinese philosopher and politician, Tung Chung-chu. Tung, as a chief minister to the 
emperor Wu (c. 140-87) of the Chinese Han dynasty, was responsible for the dismissal of all 
non-Confucian scholars from government and merging the Confucian and Yin-Yang schools 
of thought. Due to him, Confucianism (or neo-Confucianism) became the unifying ideology 
of the Han dynasty.13 In fact, this endeavor of Master Tung reflects one of the core features 
of neo-Confucianism. No matter how speculative and theoretical issues Confucian scholars 
engage in, and though the scholars different metaphysical stances sometimes lead to the 
formation of unpleasant political factions, the ultimate philosophical aim they must pursue 
                                                                          
10 Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 14-27. Cf. for a rather detailed account of how the Chosŏn 
dynasty set out as a Confucian nation, see “The Ideology of Reform,” chapter 6 of John B. Duncan, The 
Origins of the Chosŏn Dynasty (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), and also Chai-sik Chung, 
"Chŏng Tojŏn: 'Architect' of Yi Dynasty Government and Ideology," in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in 
Korea, ed. Bloom, Chan and de Bary, Neo-Confucian Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985).  
11 Qin is how 親 pronounced in Chinese and chin is in Korean; and this order of Chinese/Korean 
pronunciation is henceforth maintained. 
12 All translations so far are mine.  
13 Wing-tsit Chan, "Yin Yang Confucianism: Tung Chung-Chu," in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 
ed. Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, 1973), 271-273, 277. 
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is “to promote good character, dispositions, and consequent good actions.”14 In other words, 
in neo-Confucianism, metaphysics is in service of ethics. Accordingly, the Confucian 
governments naturally have had the perennial interest of inculcating moral virtues to the 
unlettered masses. For this reason, the Three Bonds and Five Relations, as the government’s 
politico-ethical project, were constantly preached and upheld to moralize the members of 
the society in the Moral Way, which they believed is the (neo-) Confucian way.15  
In Korea, the spreading of the Three Bonds and Five Relations, many scholars find, largely 
has to do with the work of Chŏng Yakyong (pen name Tasan, 1762-1834). As a high 
government official and an influential scholar in the late Chosŏn dynasty, Tasan proposed 
the most practical interpretation of the theory of Zhu Xi, the founder of neo-Confucianism. 
Tasan as leader of Silhak movement (the movement of practical scholarship) understood 
human nature not from the metaphysical but from the psychological sphere and observed 
the nature itself to be neither good nor evil but to be “potentially good” in that the exercise 
of free will in a right way makes the human nature better.16 For him, the right moral path of 
exercising the free will is to develop the only true virtue, which he identifies as benevolence 
or love or humanity or jen/in (仁).17 For him, jen is the collective or generic name for the 
three essential virtues that sustain right human relationship, i.e., filial piety or xiao/hyo (孝), 
fraternal respect or ti/che (悌), and compassion or ci/cha (慈).18 The supreme virtue of jen, he 
asserts, is “symbol for the number two” because it is “the association for two people.”19 E.g., 
one meets another or others in a two-people relation. If I treat my elder brother with 
fraternal respect or ti, it is jen. If I serve my king with loyalty, it is jen. Also, “the fulfillment 
of respective duties in relationship between all pairs of people, including spouses and 
friends, is jen.” With all these, Tasan could argue that the three virtues are equated with the 
Five Relations.20 In other words, for him, the Five Relations  are normative ethical directives 
inherently laden with the three virtues. 
Neo-Confucian ethics presupposes the a priori moral path, based upon which all human 
beings are closely and rightly related to one another, and sees the society as a grand family 
where all members in it are bonded to one another as fathers/mothers, sons/daughters, 
older brothers/sisters, younger brothers/sisters, etc. Thus, maintaining and strengthening 
the “right kind of interpersonal relationship” – e.g., caring-parents and obeying children, 
caring husbands and respecting wives, caring teachers and submissive students, caring 
physicians and the patients that put great trust and respect in the physicians, etc. – is the 
                                                                          
14 John Berthrong, "Dead Riders and Living Horses: The Problem of Principle/Li 理," in International 
Conference on the Development of the Worldviews in Early Modern Asia (Center for the Study of East Asian 
Civilizations at National Taiwan University: 2005), 4. 
15 Peter H. Lee, "Versions of the Self," in The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea, ed. Irene Bloom, Wing-tsit 
Chan, and Wm Theodore de Bary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 484. 
16 Mark Setton, "Tasan's 'Practical Learning'," Philosophy of East and West 39, no. 4 (Oct. 1989): 380. 
17 “仁” is pronounced jen in Chinese and in in Korean. This order of marking is maintained throughout 
this essay.  
18 Setton, "Tasan's 'Practical Learning,'" 382-386. 
19 In fact, the Chinese character “仁” jen/chen pictographicallyis represents the relationship between 
“two people.” For further discussion, see Judith A. Berling, "Confucianism," Asian Religions 2, no. 1 (Fall 
1996), p.5.  
20 Setton, "Tasan's 'Practical Learning'." 
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center of neo-Confucian practical ethics. In this sense, neo-Confucian ethics is in some way a 
more developed variation of the Western care ethics and some postmodern ethics. In Korean 
context, Tasan’s unique rendering of the Three Bonds and Five Relations as the practical 
ethical codes in which the ideals of cosmic Confucian moral virtues are embodied is one 
important example that shows how serious Korean scholar-politicians were when they 
attempted to shape the practical moral mentality of their countrymen in accordance with the 
Confucian Path.  
Over the last century until now, as part of modernization, the Western power has caused 
ideological, political, and economic shifts in Korea, particularly in urban areas. 
Nevertheless, many scholars find contemporary South Korea to be the model in which the 
most successful settlement of Confucian/neo-Confucian ideology is found. In South Korea, 
it is fairly easy to see the Confucian influence in every corner of the country. Older people 
are greatly respected. Even slight differences in ages are acknowledged. The proper sense of 
“friendship” exists only between the same age people. Even a one-year difference in age 
makes two people in a hierarchical relationship; the younger person is expected to call the 
older person “older brother/sister,” not by his/her first name. Among a group of friends or 
co-workers, the oldest person is expected to pay in a restaurant or bar and the youngest is 
expected to pour wine or beer and serve the food. Differences in social ranks are also 
recognized; the relationship between juniors and seniors (in the order of rank) in social 
institutions (e.g., private companies, militaries, government offices, etc.) is highly important. 
The juniors are supposed to obey the seniors with the same kind of respect they give to their 
older brothers and sisters and their parents, and the seniors are to take care of the juniors 
with the same sort of affection they give to their younger brothers and sisters and their 
children. A family plays a very special role in the society. For Koreans, family is not only the 
bond that the Heaven ties in an individual level but also the conservatory of social morality. 
The family feels corporate responsibility for its member when the member violates social 
norms. Also, defying one’s own parents, particularly the father, is considered a hideous act, 
the act blamable by the entire society.  
5. Two cautions  
I have so far, in a brief fashion, tried to account for what neo-Confucianism is, largely from 
the standpoint of practical/social ethics, and show how the Confucian ethical ideology 
appears in everyday life of contemporary South Korea. In this section, I want to focus on 
two particular moral values, “autonomy” and “beneficence,” and attempt to show how the 
researchers’ different choices of interpreting the same moral terms influence their own 
understandings of the moral structure of different cultures compared, insofar as common 
morality is concerned.  
First, let us say that “beneficence” is defined as “charitable act or state,” and “autonomy” 
“self-governed act or state.” Defining the terms in this thin manner is a way of 
understanding them in a formal level. Both members of the liberal individualist and neo-
Confucian cultures should feel the definitions valid. The lexical definitions of the words in 
standard Korean language dictionaries, “자선 (beneficence)” and “자율 (autonomy),” also 
confirm the soundness of this formal way of understanding the terms. If so, it turns out that 
neo-Confucian and the liberal individualist cultures share the meanings of “beneficence” 
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and “autonomy.” Then, could the moral values be in tension or in conflict with each other in 
certain situations?  
To begin, it is interesting to note that neo-Confucianism’s emphasis on “the senior’s care for 
juniors”21 and “the junior’s respect for seniors” has resulted coincidently in uplifting the 
Hippocratic paternalism as a great moral value in hospitals in Korea – it is to be reminded 
that the terms “senior” and “junior” here are used in reference to both age and rank in social 
institutions. For Koreans, the doctor’s beneficence that the Hippocratic paternalism stresses 
is regarded as the value of the senior’s care for juniors that the Confucianism promotes, 
given that the medical doctors in Korea is treated like a Confucian elder due to their 
respected social position. Accordingly, in Korea, patients in general are not likely to 
challenge what their doctors recommend the patients should do. It is the fact that the 
Korean doctors’ medical advises carry more weights to their patients than those of the 
Western doctors to their patients, and that the patients’ trust and respect for their doctors 
are greater in Korea than in North American and Western Europe. In Korean soap-operas, 
movies, documentaries, the oft-used “moving scenes” are that the spouses or parents of 
terminally ill patients literally bow their heads down to the feet of their doctors, asking for 
help.22 In this cultural atmosphere, “beneficence” as the doctor’s charitable act is taken into 
much more serious consideration than “autonomy” as the patient’s self-governed act. This 
contrasts with the fact that the Hippocratic paternalism has largely been evicted from many 
Western countries and is sometimes considered even a moral disvalue or a form of 
patronization, as liberal individualism has dominated the Western cultural ethos.23 Note 
that Daniel Callahan observes and says that, due to the cultural/traditional dominance of 
liberal individualism in the West, moral solution of many Western ethicists, like the 
principlists, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress, always ends in giving priority to 
autonomy over beneficence.24  
Despite all these, however, it is highly difficult to say that beneficence is prioritized over 
autonomy in Korea. If we ask any Koreans whether the doctor’s charitable act is considered 
weightier than the patient’s self-governed will or vice versa, without raising a particular 
case of conflict or tension between the two values in detail, most of them may answer that 
the patient’s will should be considered first because, bluntly put, “decisions on your own 
health, or on your own life or death are ultimately your own business, though doctors’ 
words should be respected.” Besides, as it is the case in the Western countries as well as in 
Korea, actual moral verdicts in hospital seem de-facto legal ones, in that the cases are solved 
in the way that the doctors, nurses, and hospital lawyers may not legally be liable for the 
final agreements they come to with the patients and their families. Because of that, the actual 
                                                                          
21 Unlike in the Western societies, the “care for senior citizens” is a derogatory term in the Confucian 
East; it must be (the younger people’s) “respect to senior citizens.”    
22 This is more prevalent in the working class than the upper class people and in suburban than urban 
areas. In urban areas and for the upper-high class, individualism alongside the Western capitalistic 
lifestyle has been expanding.  
23 Perhaps, the majority of people in both cultures are short of the proper understandings of the 
Hippocratic texts. To read the texts properly, we may need an appreciation of the nuances of social 
relations and expectations. 
24 Daniel Callahan, "Principlism and Communitarianism," Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (2003): 288-
289.  
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cases in Korean hospitals turn out in the way that the will of the patients is granted through 
their own expressions, advance directives, or surrogate autonomy.  
Here, the advocates of common morality can argue as follows. The denizens of neo-
Confucian and the liberal individualist cultures both recognize and share the meanings of 
“beneficence” and “autonomy” respectively as the “charitable act” and as the “self-
governed will.” Also, both cultures prioritize autonomy over beneficence, they may 
emphasize, in general, in the sense that both cultures agree with the prioritization without 
getting involved with particular cases in detail. If so, they can argue, it can be said that, at 
least in a weak sense, both cultures consider autonomy weightier than beneficence, whereby 
giving to the validity of the existence of common, universal morality.  
However, there is a way that the opponents of common morality can turn around the whole 
case in their favor. It is to investigate the cultures in a concrete, situational context. First of 
all, pointing out that the moral verdicts of actual cases in hospital may be all legal de facto, 
they can ask to put them aside and say that we need to discuss what is clearly moral in a 
hand-on level. Then, they can suggest that we better focus on how people in two different 
cultures understand moral terms on a concrete level. They may give beneficence and 
autonomy respectively the meanings of the “act of concealing from the terminally ill 
patients the information that they will die soon because it is likely that the information 
revealed will harm the patients like increasing distress or shortening life significantly by 
shock” and of “the act of making their own informed decisions on their own life and death.”  
I believe that the thick definitions like above are extremely proper in the Western hospital 
setting and well explain how people in the Western world (not only the Western liberal 
individualist world) think. From Judao-Christian Europe through modern and post-modern 
eras to contemporary liberal individualist period, the “human person” as a moral agent has 
been portrayed as a lonely being destined to seek one’s own moral perfection, thereby being 
responsible for success or failure in one’s own ethical journey. In short, a human person is 
an independent, if not isolated, being. Due to that, autonomy is the act of my own and 
beneficence that of others. Thus, it is natural that the meanings of beneficence and autonomy, 
whether thick or thin, are to be in conflict or in tension with each other.  
However, that is not the case in neo-Confucian culture. Although thin, formal definitions of 
beneficence and autonomy may be in conflict or tension, the terms understood in a thick, 
material-content level are not to be in conflict or in tension. As mentioned earlier, the 
Confucian culture binds every individual in the society to be a member of the grand family. 
Thus, the neo-Confucian conception of a human person as an individual being is very 
different from the liberal individualist understanding of it. For Confucians, the human 
person is not an independent being but the one inherently dependent upon and personal to 
others within the web of society-family. Thus, in contrast to the liberal individualist view 
that “caring others” is my own act done to others whose ethical existence is ultimately 
independent from me, the Confucians regard “caring others” as my brotherly or sisterly act 
done to my own family members in a larger scale. In Korea it is customary that the terms 
like “father” “brother” “grandmother” “uncle” are used when complete strangers speak to 
one another. In retail stores, a female customer calls a female sales attendant “sister.” A 
doctor in hospital calls his elderly patient “father” or “grandfather.” A little schoolboy in the 
street calls an adult passerby “uncle” when he asks for direction. In this social atmosphere, 
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proper interpretations of beneficence and autonomy in a concrete context must be in 
conjunction with an interpersonal relationship between a particular patient and the patient’s 
doctor. If so, the two terms conceived in the thick level cannot have neat and isolated 
meanings to be compared, and thus not in conflict or in tension. The account so far will be 
more intelligent when rephrased through some particular cases.  
Suppose that in Korea a 5-year-old child is terminally ill, her parents are about 30 years old, 
and the doctor in charge is about 50 years old. The parents feel morally bound to respect the 
doctor’s decision. Even though the doctor’s decision turns out later seriously mistaken, the 
parents would feel morally wrong to take a legal action against him (unless the doctor’s 
decision is found to be out of his negligence or malintent). In analysis, the doctor’s 
beneficence will be something like “the act of taking care of his young patient as if the 
patient were his own grandson, while incorporating the wishes of the child’s biological 
parents as though they were the words of his own son or nephew or niece”; and that of the 
patient’s autonomy is “the act of showing the patients’ own wishes though his surrogate 
authority while taking into serious consideration of the doctor’s advices as if they were their 
own father or uncle’s words.”  
To give another example, suppose that a 60-year-old terminally ill patient’s primary doctor 
is about 40 years old. Then, it is considered morally right that the doctor’s beneficence must 
be expressed in the manner of filial piety towards the father-like patient. Note that in Korea 
it is very much common in hospitals that younger doctors and nurses call elderly patients 
“father,” “mother,” “grandfather,” “grandmother,” “uncle,” “aunt,” etc. Thus, the doctor’s 
beneficence will be “the act of caring for his patient as if he were his own father or uncle.” 
On the other hand, the patient cannot treat the doctor like his own child based on his 
seniority by age. As mentioned above, in neo-Confucianism, the authority of seniority is 
recognized by age and also by social rank. The medical doctors in Korea are treated like 
Confucian elders due to their respected social position. Hence, the patient’s autonomy here 
will be like “the act of showing his own opinions while respecting the doctor’s advices like 
his own father or uncle’s words (by social rank).”  
Due to the cultural atmosphere where everyone is considered a member of society-family, 
the meanings of two terms are laid out in conjunction or mixture with other moral values 
(e.g., care, respect, trust, etc.). Accordingly, their meanings are viewed organically 
intertwined rather than in conflict or tension.25 Therefore, it is not only that beneficence and 
autonomy defined in the thick level cannot be in conflict or in tension, but also that the 
question whether beneficence is prioritized over autonomy does not arise – this fact, I 
believe, is one of the major reasons that normative practical ethics cannot come out of the 
Confucian East Asia.26  
                                                                          
25 Note the contrast with the Western liberal individualist culture where the meanings of beneficence 
and autonomy, thick or thick, are conceived mostly independently of other values. 
26 Despite my presentation has treated the cases of comparative cultures so far, the problem of language 
is not less serious within one culture. For example, beneficence and autonomy are not always in tension 
with each other, even in the Western liberal individualist ethics. E.g., the doctor’s telling the patient 
about his terminally ill condition, in many cases, is taken to respect the patient’s autonomy, which is in 
harmony with beneficence (allowing the patient to have relatively quality time without the fear of his 
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The great cultural difference exhibited, so far, through the cases of how the moral terms, 
beneficence and autonomy, are interpreted and used in the two different cultures, can give 
the opponents of common morality a firm ground to deny common-morality theses.  
So far, I have tried to present the cases of comparative cultural studies in favor respectively 
of the advocates and the opponents of common morality, and to show that the forces of their 
arguments depend on how they define the moral terms they would like to use to investigate 
the cultures in question. The thinner definitions they use, it turns out, the more likely the 
defenders of common morality are to successfully argue for the validity of their thesis. And 
the thicker meanings they adopt, the more easily the opponents of common morality are to 
win the fight. Then, our question is which level of defining the terms, thick or thin, is valid 
or philosophically more important. I would say both levels are equally valid and important. 
The thin, formal level is almost identical to the usage of a standard language dictionary. As 
one of the important purposes of dictionary is, this broad way of understanding terms helps 
us conceptualize aspects of morality in an orderly manner. It’s like filing data in our mind to 
understand what morality is. And what is amazing is that, regardless of cultural and 
traditional differences, we all understand and share this universal way of filing things and 
recognize its importance. On the other hand, the thick, material-content level of 
understanding moral terms is important in the way that we can understand how the terms 
are actually used in a particular context. As a result, it can be said that the arguments of both 
dissenting parties, the advocates and opponents of common morality, are consistent in their 
own constructs. However, given that the way they define the terms predetermines what 
they are going to argue, the kernel of their arguments from empirical evidence, that is, that a 
set of neutral examples the researchers impartially discover in different cultures supports 
their theoretical conclusions, is defeated. 
The second caution I want to call for, though related to the first caution, is that the 
situational contexts where the cases of comparative culture are located are different, 
sometimes vastly different. In reality, the cases I presented above are usually entangled with 
more complicated interpersonal relationship. In the former case, for example, the 5-year-old 
patient might have 60-year-old grandparents and they might insist on their opinions on the 
child’s condition against the doctor’s will. Then, the case becomes the one we need to 
consider the values of the grandparents’ beneficence/care for the child along with their 
senior authority, of the doctor’s competing beneficence for the child with senior authority, 
and of the child’s parents’ respect for the two opposing wills between their parents and the 
doctor. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to locate any examples to be what the researchers 
call the “evidences.” The evidences to be compared should be relatively simple and 
straightforward in the sense that the two cases compared have similitude in a large part and 
dissimilitude in some minor part. E.g., there can be good comparisons between baseball and 
softball, but not between baseball and canoeing. In other words, the example they find in 
one culture may not have its proper counterpart-example to be compared in another culture. 
However, this is not to say that the complexity that makes two cultures incomparable is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
soon-to-be-coming death). For many patients who put the value of autonomous decisions on their 
own lives over that of not having the fear of death, beneficence and autonomy collapse. I am grateful for 
Prof. Michael Langford at Cambridge for his comment here in the footnote.  
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premise in favor of the opposing thesis of common morality. It is just that there can hardly 
be “proper data”, based on which two cultures can be compared, in order either to support 
or to deny common-morality theses.  
6. Conclusion 
The researchers of comparative cultural studies, I suggest, should be mindful of two things. 
First, there are two different levels of conceiving moral terms, i.e., formal and material-
content levels, though the levels can only be understood in gradation from being thin to 
thick. And the researchers’ pre-choice of how much thin or thick the meanings of the moral 
terms should be determines the conclusions they desire to support. This fact belies their held 
position of the argument from empirical evidences, namely, that a set of impartial 
discoveries as neutral evidences yields a conclusion, either pro or contra common-morality 
theses. Second, the complexity constituted out of the variety of situational contexts that 
different cultural ideologies produce is so great that the examples the researchers find in one 
culture may be unique to that particular culture, the fact of which makes comparative 
cultural investigation itself extremely difficult.  
The argument from empirical evidences may be a myth. In comparative cultural study with 
regard to common morality, there should be a discussion whether or not the researchers can 
agree on or concede to a particular level of defining moral terms before delving into sets of 
examples to be found in different cultures. The agreement or concession can be 
philosophical (theoretical) or practical. The philosophical agreement on or concession to the 
particular level naturally yields to that of the position either of advocating or denying 
common-morality theses, while the practical agreement or concession does not. The 
practical agreement or concession has freedom of not binding itself to any one theoretical 
position. For this, critics may say that the agreement or concession out of practical reasons is 
making its validity based not on the higher standard of truths but on usefulness or 
practicality.27 They may call the practical agreement or concession “utilitarian” in a 
nefarious sense. The critics are right that the practical reasons are not the higher standard of 
truths. However, I believe in as much as the reasons are balanced and in service of public 
good (good of a particular culture or tradition), they are good enough for us, particularly in 
the field of medical ethics.28  
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